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Abstract
For centuries, China sought to suppress opium consumption within its borders.
Following the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power, the 1950’s drug suppression
campaign initiated new attempts to bring about the end of opium’s presence within
Chinese society. What led to this campaign’s success is its utilization of different
strategies within each region of focus. The combination of strategies used allowed the
CCP to eradicate all forms of the opium market in both urban and rural areas where the
campaign was active. This thesis examines the methods used during the campaign and
how these methods resulted in the campaign’s success.
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Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to describe the People’s Republic of China’s opium
suppression campaign between 1949 and 1952 and discuss the reasons why this
campaign was more successful in its goal of eliminating opium than previous campaigns.
To analyze this campaign, each chapter will discuss different aspects of this campaign.
Chapter 1 will cover the presence of opium in China in the decade leading up to the
campaign. Chapter 2 discusses the campaign’s influence on opium suppression in rural
China, while Chapter 3 focuses on opium suppression in urban China.
There were major difficulties in studying this topic. Information regarding this
specific campaign is limited due to the mostly secretive nature through which the
campaign was carried out, as well as the lack of documentation during the campaign. As
a result, research on this campaign is based on the few secondary sources covering this
campaign, as well as directives published by provincial governments.
China’s history of opium began in the 7th century when opium was exploited for
its medicinal properties. Opium possessed pain-relieving properties which made it
useful in the treatment of a large variety of illnesses. It was also believed to be able to
cure many different diseases, from cholera to plague.1 As the popularity of opium

Frank Dikotter, Lars Laamann and Zhou Xun. "Narcotic Culture: A Social History of Drug
Consumption in China." British Journal of Criminology (2002): 317-336.
1
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spread throughout China over the centuries, opium gained other uses, mainly within
China’s smoking culture.
In the 19th century, opium smoking became a leisure activity among the Chinese
elite, especially in cities such as Shanghai which were populated with numerous opium
dens. Where tobacco was mainly seen as the product of choice for the average citizen,
opium took on a popularity of its own. In Shanghai, smoking opium was tied to the
privileged life of the wealthy class, the ability to afford the leisure that others could not
enjoy. Opium smoking also stimulated the economies of these cities by stimulating the
flow of goods and wealth. This circulation of opium and commodities made opium
extremely important to China’s urban societies.2
During the 18th and 19th century, Britain as well as the U.S. profited from
exporting opium to China. However, the growing trade imbalance eventually culminated
into the Opium Wars. On the eve of this conflict, the Imperial Commissioner Lin Zexu
sought to purge all opium consumption within China while also ending opium’s
importation from other countries. Lin Zexu sent a series of letters to the British monarch
in an effort to put a halt to the international opium trade taking place in Canton, China.
In these letters, Lin argued that the importation and sale of opium in China was immoral
and insisted that the monarch prevent future trade. Lin Zexu also attempted to halt
opium trade and oust opium merchants from Canton by force. Lin’s efforts, however,
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Alexander Des Forges. “Opium/Leisure/Shanghai: Urban Economies of Consumption.” Opium
Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000:
167-182.
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ultimately failed as the British navy overcame Chinese forces and prevented China’s
emperor from completely eradicating opium sales.3
In the 1850’s, the British further expanded their demands to include greater
trade rights to British merchants, including the legalization of opium trade. When China
was unable to oppose British forces, these demands were incorporated into the Treaty
of Tianjin in 1860.4 The role of foreigners in the Opium Wars had a lasting effect on how
the Chinese viewed opium in the 20th century.
The failure of China to win the Opium Wars, however, did not end the opium
suppression movement in China. Other suppression campaigns soon followed the
Opium Wars, such as the 1907 campaign led by the late Qing dynasty. However, these
campaigns did not generate much success until the mid 20th century, beginning with the
1930’s campaign. This campaign consisted of the Six-Year Plan which began in 1935. The
plan attempted to control opium by putting all aspects of the opium market, including
production, sale and consumption, under government control. While the plan was
initially successful, its usefulness in granting the Chinese Nationalist government a
means of profiting off of opium taxes eventually undermined the Six-Year Plan’s original
goal of complete drug eradication. While the 1930’s campaign did not completely
eliminate opium trade and consumption, it was a turning point in China’s opium
suppression efforts. Suddenly, China began to see progress in its goal of completely
eradicating all signs of opium in the country.
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It was not until the early 1950’s that China accomplished its goal of eliminating
opium from within its borders. This was not a simple task. It required the coordination
of numerous regional governments to ensure that opium production and consumption
would not be given an opportunity to return. This thesis will explore how China brought
opium production and consumption to an end.
The development of this thesis began with an analysis of Zhou Yongming’s
studies. In Anti-Drug Crusades in 20th Century China, Zhou Yongming discusses the
1950’s opium suppression campaign in China. Zhou notes different aspects of the
campaign, such as its rallies, edicts and connections to the Chinese Communist Party.
While Zhou provides a brief overview of the campaign, he does not provide an in-depth
description of the various tactics used during the campaign nor why this campaign was
successful. This thesis will build on Zhou’s arguments regarding the role opium
suppression played in the Chinese Communist Party’s consolidation of its power, as well
as the reasons behind the success of the campaign.
The main cause behind the 1950’s campaign’s success was its utilization of
multiple different suppression strategies. Rural and urban parts of China displayed
different opium situations. Poppy fields populated many villages in Sichuan, Yunnan and
other agricultural regions. Cities like Shanghai and Nanjing, on the other hand, were
littered with drug factories, drug dealers and addicts. Facing different problems within
each region required that the PRC government develop different strategies within rural
and urban areas. The combined use of these strategies allowed the PRC government to
target all segments of the opium market.

7

The 1950’s campaign was highly successful in adjusting to the distinct variations
within these regions. As a result of these policies, law enforcement was able to track,
arrest, interrogate and punish drug offenders at various levels of the drug market. In
rural China, local governments also located poppy fields and destroyed the crop to
prevent further opium production. In cities, law enforcement raided drug factories, shut
down opium dens and rehabilitated addicts. To prevent the re-introduction of opium to
populations, anti-drug rallies were held to sway public opinion regarding drug sales and
consumption. To further emphasize the importance of the campaign, anti-drug rhetoric
and policies were linked to political campaigns, such as the “Resist U.S. Aggression and
Aid Korea” campaign and land reform. The extensive combination of strategies used
during the course of these campaigns ensured that opium could no longer persist in
China.
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Chapter 1: Opium Trade in the 1940’s
To better understand the opium situation that was present when the PRC
initiated its campaign to end opium production and consumption in the early 1950’s,
one must first take a look at the years leading up to the campaign. The 1940’s marks a
period of time between what is arguably two of China’s most important opium
suppression campaigns: The Six-Year Plan and the PRC suppression campaign. Between
these two campaigns, there were several events that would later shape the 1950’s
campaign.
After decades of the Chinese combatting the proliferation of opium in China, the
1940’s saw significant shifts in the presence of opium in Chinese society.5 During the
1930’s, measures such as the Six-Year Plan were successful in reducing opium
production and consumption but failed to completely eliminate the drug’s presence.
Enacted by the Chinese Nationalist government in 1935, the Six-Year Plan’s official goal
was to control and reduce the cultivation, distribution and consumption of opium,
mainly by transferring control over all opium-related operations to the government and
taxing consumers of opium.6 However, corruption and government interest in revenue
derived from opium taxes, one of the methods used to control opium consumption,
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Brook, Timothy and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi. Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan,
1839-1952. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000: 25.
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Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007: 177-193.
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impeded the complete eradication of opium. Control over opium sales provided the
Chinese Nationalist government and warlord governments, such as Long Yun in Yunnan
province, an opportunity to generate revenue and pay for their military costs, adding a
barrier to opium suppression.
One example of this conflict of interest was the Nationalist leader Chiang Kaishek. In public, Chiang Kai-shek, the chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, openly
criticized gambling and opium smoking and rebuked those who engaged in these
activities. For example, in 1940, Chiang Kai-shek called for stricter punishments for
opium dealers. During one of his speeches, Chiang stated that individuals who cultivate,
transport, or sell opium should be executed. Anyone who aids and/or abets in these
drug activities should also be executed. Anyone who aids authorities in locating and
arresting opium dealers should be rewarded while those who attempt to hide opium
stores should be severely punished.7 Despite holding such a strong view against opium,
some sources indicate that Chiang Kai-shek may have, like several other government
officials, secretly profited off of opium trafficking through tax systems.8 Furthermore,
Chiang Kai-shek had allied himself with Du Yuesheng, leader of the Shanghai Green
Gang. The Green Gang regularly participated in drug trafficking and sales to generate
revenue while also supporting Chiang’s political operations.9 The fact that Chiang Kai-
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shek benefited from opium monopolies in China as well as cooperated with local gangs
likely interfered with his drive to eliminate opium’s consumption.
The Nationalist government, however, were not the only ones who show
evidence of participating in China’s opium trade. According to Chen Yongfa, during the
Anti-Japanese War, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also supported itself through
the sale of a “special product.” This “special product” accounted for 40 percent of the
Communist’s trade in 1945 Shaanxi and was important to the military’s ability to
purchase food and weapons.10 While profiting from opium sales, the CCP simultaneously
condemned opium and sought to reform addicts. Chen argues that the Party continued
to support opium trafficking until 1948 despite the Party expressing anti-drug values.
Due to these issues regarding willingness to enforce bans and restrictions,
regions in the South, such as Sichuan and Xikang, were still producing and exporting
opium even at the end of the Six-Year Plan.11 The failure of the Six-Year Plan to
completely eliminate opium production allowed opium to be a persistent issue into the
1940’s. The U.S. government estimated that three years after the Six-Year Plan ended,
China was producing at least 1100 tons of opium annually, making up nearly half of the
world’s total production of opium.12
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During the 1940’s, nationalist discourse on the issue of opium focused on antidrug rhetoric. Government officials viewed opium as a poison to both families and
society, equating drug activities, such as sale and consumption, to treason. Many argued
that since opium harbored the potential to harm the bodies, wealth, moral integrity and
families of Chinese citizens, its effects would inevitably weaken the entire nation.13 A
country brimming with opium addicts would be less capable of defending itself from
foreign invaders. Based on this viewpoint, nationalists equated opium dealing to a
desire to undermine and destroy China as a whole.
This rhetoric was further strengthened with claims that the current opium
epidemic was the result of foreign aggression. Officials blamed other countries, such as
Britain and Japan, for China’s existing opium epidemic.14 Britain received a portion of
the blame due to the nation’s involvement in the Opium Wars during the 19th century.
However, a majority of the criticism was aimed at Japan. The Second-Sino Japanese War
from 1937 to 1945 played a strong role in China’s view of opium. During Japan’s
occupation of China in the early 1940’s, collaborationist governments supported
themselves with revenue generated from opium produced in China. These Japanese
puppet regimes sought to develop opium monopolies in the parts of China under their
control. As a result, numerous opium dens and trafficking routes were established by
Japanese puppet regimes throughout China. Gangsters and local law enforcement
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officers in cities aided these governments by collecting information regarding potential
markets for opium and trafficking the drug to urban consumers.15 The result of these
monopolies was an increased prevalence in opium consumption in occupied regions. By
engaging in these practices, the Japanese were able to further expand opium trafficking
in China.
Multiple governments profited off of opium trade. One example is the
Mengjiang regime, a puppet state for the Japanese empire operating in present day
Inner Mongolia. Between 1939 and 1942, the Mengjiang regime exported more than
half of its opium to Shanghai, a narcotics center for opium and heroin and their
distribution in China.16 The Nationalist Party argued that Japan was using opium as a
tool to weaken China, thus connecting opium suppression to the Anti-Japanese War
efforts. Those who continued to support the circulation of opium in China were
considered traitors and were punished severely for their crimes.
The Wang Jingwei government was one such group that is believed to have
cooperated with the Japanese to sell opium within China. The Wang regime sought to
establish a monopoly over opium trade to garner revenue generated by its sale.17 At the
same time, they desired to support opium suppression programs and avoid undermining
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their credibility by supporting the Japanese. While the Wang regime did implement new
suppression policies in the early 1940’s, the imbalance between their desire to profit off
of opium and eliminate opium continued to undermine these policies. One such policy
was an opium tax. The opium tax contributed to approximately 5 percent of the
government’s revenue, allowing them to continue earning money from opium
trafficking while passively discouraging its consumption.18
Along with foreign aggression, opium was also tied to the issue of warlords,
feudal bureaucrats, and landlords in southwest China. Many of these individuals
profited off of forcing peasants to cultivate large tracts of opium poppy and smuggle the
product throughout China. In regions, such as Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan and Fujian,
peasants were coerced into converting farmland into poppy fields. Peasants who failed
to grow opium poppy were frequently forced to pay taxes that made not planting opium
poppies impractical.19 Sichuan and Shaanxi were particularly notorious for these taxes.
In some counties, officials would charge exorbitant land taxes that farmers could only
afford if they grew opium. In other regions, peasants who did not grow a minimum
amount of opium poppies were required to pay a “laziness tax” incentivizing locals to
continue cultivating opium poppy. However, those who successfully grew opium were
also burdened with problems. In some regions, troops would be dispatched to extort an

Motohiro Kobayashi. “An Opium Tug-of-War: Japan Versus Wang Jingwei Regime.” Opium
Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952. Ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2000: 346-352.
19
Edward R. Slack. Opium, State, and Society: China's Narco-Economy and the Guomindang,
1924-1937. University of Hawaii Press, 2000: 11.
18
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opium tax from local farmers. These somewhat contradictory taxation systems
eventually led to violent protests from farmers.20 Alongside targeting farmers, warlords
would also use the opium produced to control local troops.21 During the early 1940’s,
warlords would supply opium to troops, eventually making the troops entirely
dependent on the warlord to feed their opium addiction. In this way, warlords were able
to use opium to foster obedience among their soldiers. To go along with their control
over troops, was these warlord’s ability to bribe, intimidate, and undermine any
government officials who attempted to enforce eradication programs. Any officials
seeking to reduce opium consumption within these territories were met with challenges
from the warlords and landlords controlling these lands. Local magistrates would also
falsify data regarding the prevalence of poppy cultivation so that it would appear that
little intervention was needed. These forces inhibited opium suppression in southwest
and northwest China.
The government took many efforts to combat poppy cultivation during the early
1940’s. Despite continued attempts to pass and enforce further legislation to combat
opium production, the resistance to these policies frequently rendered them ineffective.
This was especially the case in rural regions of China where farmers heavily relied on
opium poppy as a cash crop.

Lucien Bianco. “The Responses of Opium Growers to Eradication Campaigns and the Poppy
Tax, 1907-1949.” Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000: 306.
21
Alan Baumler. Chinese and Opium under the Republic: Worse Than Floods and Wild Beasts.
State University of New York Press, 2007: 89.
20
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County magistrates, such as the one in Luxi, Yunnan, would order farmers to
grow poppy, encourage farmers to bribe officials to protect their crops, then falsely
report that poppy plants had been destroyed.22 When the Luxi court magistrate
continued to extort opium farmers, farmers fought and killed soldiers sent to uproot
poppy plants as well as the magistrate.
Luxi, however, wasn’t the only example of conflict between Chinese troops,
officials and poppy farmers. The Chinese Nationalist government dispatched troops to
different parts of Sichuan province to uproot and destroy opium crops. Many opium
growers resisted these military forces through different means. Bribery, which had been
used in the past to encourage government officials to ignore opium cultivation, was less
effective during the 1940’s as many of these military forces were under the supervision
of provincial authorities. Although rare, other farmers would sometimes resort to
violence to oppose the destruction of their opium crops. In March of 1944, such battles
broke out in the villages of Xiaoyuan and Houyuan in Fujian province.23 Opium farmers
successfully drove off military forces and later reached an agreement with local officials.
Rather than immediately destroying all poppy crops, the magistrate allowed farms to
continue growing their existing poppy crops for one more year before banning poppy
cultivation.

22
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At the same time, opium farmers resented new policies controlling poppy
cultivation because of the conflicts these policies created with existing practices. In
parts of Guizhou, magistrates ordered farmers to increase poppy production so that
they could charge a tax on the crop. However, in 1943, the year following this order, the
magistrate received orders from the Guizhou government calling for the immediate
removal of opium crops. Villagers violently resisted this order, eventually culminating in
a standoff between hundreds of farmers and armed military forces. While poppy
removal was eventually successful in this region, these conflicts resulted in the deaths
and injuries of hundreds of farmers.24
While rural China faced the problem of poppy cultivation, urban China was
troubled by another issue. War as well as restrictions on trafficking led opium to
become a relatively scarce but valuable commodity in large cities like Shanghai. The
opium market became a useful means of collecting money. Chinese merchants hired to
work under official supervision distributed opium throughout Shanghai. Japanese teams
participated in reopening and registering old opium dens to revive drug consumption
and attract new customers. Registration of these dens allowed Chinese dealers to gain
access to opium supplies that would have been otherwise unavailable to them and sell
the drug under the cover of Japanese protection. At the beginning of the 1940’s, the
amount of opium imported into Nanjing each month was estimated to be roughly 2,500

Lucien Bianco. “The Responses of Opium Growers to Eradication Campaigns and the Poppy
Tax, 1907-1949.” Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839-1952. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000: 307.
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kilograms per month.25 Some of this raw opium was sent to factories where it was
refined to make morphine and heroin. These products were sold by drug dealers to
addicts within Nanjing. Thus, opium consumption remained an enduring issue in China’s
major cities.
Even after the end of Japanese occupation, opium continued to be an issue. In
1946, the Shanghai government issued measures for registering smokers. Despite
registering over 6,000 opium smokers, Shanghai still struggled to deal with opium
dealers and manufacturers. The Shanghai Department of Public Security estimated that
the city contained 23 drug factories and over 30,000 people participating in the
production and trafficking of drugs.26 Despite Shanghai establishing the Shanghai AntiSmoking Association in 1947, drug dealers and traffickers remained present throughout
the city.
Although China made numerous attempts to curtail poppy cultivation and opium
consumption during the 1940’s, none of these attempts were successful on a national
scale. Therefore, it became necessary for the CCP to introduce a new suppression
campaign to bring an end to the drug’s persistence.
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Chapter 2: Opium Suppression in Rural China
The PRC’s opium suppression campaign between 1949 and 1952 targeted both
rural and urban regions of China in order to achieve complete eradication of opium. By
contrast, previous campaigns had achieved only partial success. The Nationalist
government had carried out methods that did not take into consideration the specific
conditions and environment in which opium trade was propagated within the region. In
some rural areas, local governments focused on uprooting poppy fields without
addressing other related factors, such as warlordism, rampant drug addiction or even
the motivations of the individuals cultivating poppies. These officials’ lack of foresight
failed to bring opium trafficking and consumption to an end. To successfully eliminate
opium in both of these environments, PRC officials would have to introduce tactics that
were applied on a case-by-case basis.
There were stark differences between the presence of opium in rural and urban
China. While the consumption of opium was centered in cities such as Shanghai, poppy
fields were pervasive in several rural, southern regions of China. Within Sichuan, China,
an estimated 134,045 mu (20,000 acres) of farmland was used to cultivate opium poppy
in 1949.27 In Guangdong Province, it is estimated that around 150,000 mu (22,400 acres)

27
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was used for cultivating opium poppy that same year. Overall, documents from the
1940’s estimate that roughly 3 percent of the agricultural sector in rural China was
dedicated to opium production.28 Farmers viewed opium poppies as a valuable cash
crop because less land was required for cultivation, and the opium crop was more
lucrative than food crops grown in the same region. An acre of fertile farmland could
produce as much as 90 kilograms of opium in a single year.29 The process of collecting
opium was also very simple. Farmers would make cuts along the stems of maturing
poppies and allow sap to collect on the surface of the stem. Once the sap had dried, the
opium sap was harvested then sold in markets.30 The raw opium could be refined into a
more potent product (morphine) or used to chemically synthesize heroin. Raw opium
could be worth two to six times the value of other crops, providing a strong incentive to
grow poppies over other plants.31 Farmers used the extra money earned to purchase
new tools or extra grain. Even after the opium had been harvested from the poppy, the
leftover leaves, seeds and dried stalks could be used as a source of food or fed to
livestock animals.
The pervasiveness of poppy fields was not the only difference between rural and
urban China. Another difference was that poppy cultivation in regions such as Yunnan
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and Sichuan supplied many opium dens in cities. This meant that the opium produced
from poppy fields in rural areas tended to be more valuable if it was transported and
sold in cities rather than sold to locals. The increased value of marketed opium led to
the creation of numerous trade routes connecting poppy fields and rural markets to
large cities. These factors led to opium production being more prevalent in rural regions
as opposed to urban regions.
Small-scale opium suppression campaigns predating the 1950’s typically targeted
opium users and smugglers, especially those located in cities. The focus on smoking, the
predominant form of opium consumption, allowed many opium farmers to go
unnoticed and continue their operations. Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 1,
several of these opium farms were under the control of Chinese warlords who resisted
any government attempts to reduce poppy cultivation. Thirdly, Japanese occupation
provided an opportunity for new poppy operations to be developed within China. These
issues inhibited efforts to eradicate opium and poppies in rural China.
During the 1950’s campaign, however, these problems were largely avoided.
Vestigial Chinese warlordism had become nearly non-existent by the 1950’s due to
conflict with the Kuomintang, followed by the Communists’ unification in 1949.
Moreover, the PRC government decided to carefully catalogue drug activity within each
region of interest before making any coordinated attempts at eliminating drug usage. It
was this planning and information-gathering that allowed the 1950’s campaign to avoid
many of the significant issues that previous suppression campaigns had faced.

21

The first step of the 1949 to 1952 opium suppression campaign was collecting
intelligence and planning out how the campaign would address opium in each region.
Before drug suppression operations could be carried out, the PRC government needed
to gather information about the existing circumstances surrounding poppy cultivation
and drug trafficking in China’s rural counties. Variations in the levels of opium
consumption, poppy cultivation and drug trafficking between each region could play a
significant role in the success of anti-drug operations. Within each of these regions,
government agents worked to develop records detailing trends in poppy fields and lists
of individuals involved in the trafficking and consumption of opium. The reason for
developing these lists instead of immediately arresting drug offenders was that some
provincial governments feared that too many arrests would alert drug lords of the
agents’ operations. With regards to rural China, since poppy cultivation was the most
prevalent aspect of the opium market being studied, much focus was put into
determining the extent of these operations. Only after this research had been
conducted did cadres carry out orders to wipe out poppy cultivation in regions where
there was no military presence.
During previous suppression attempts, troops would uproot poppy fields and
charge poppy farmers exorbitant tax rates to try to discourage continued cultivation of
the plant. This tactic proved to be ineffective as these actions were met with resistance
from farmers who were not always able to afford the high tax rates. Worse still, taxation
acted as an incentive for local magistrates to encourage the continued propagation of
opium poppies rather than their destruction. The taxes collected from poppy farmers

22

was a convenient source of revenue for magistrates while they made halfhearted
attempts at lessening poppy cultivation.
The 1949 to 1952 campaign, unlike previous campaigns, utilized a different set of
approaches towards mitigating poppy cultivation. The most important measure in this
campaign was the “General Order.” The General Order’s mandates are as follows:
1. Create propaganda to mobilize the masses
2. The People’s Government at all levels and within all regions should hold
committees regarding opium suppression and eliminate opium within a
suitable timeframe
3. Eliminate opium in regions not occupied by the military, and immediately
eliminate opium after the end of military operations in regions that are
currently under a military presence
4. Outlaw the cultivation, production, trafficking and sale of all illegal narcotics
5. Encourage citizens to relinquish any opium or other narcotics in their
possession
6. Register all addicts within a suitable timeframe
7. Provide resources such as clinics and medications to aid opium addicts in
rehabilitation, but require that these medications be under the strict control
of the Chinese Health Department
8. Create rehabilitation centers in cities with severe drug problems
9. Each provincial government must develop specific methods and timetables
while cooperating with the People’s Government
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In accordance with the “General Order,” any region without military presence
immediately banned opium.32 The ban would mean that no exceptions would be
granted to individuals who grew, trafficked, or used opium regardless of their
circumstances. In every case where opium was discovered in an individual’s possession,
the General Order required that their supply of opium be confiscated, and the offender
be punished. Punishments sometimes included executions, but in most cases were
limited to prison sentences usually ranging from 2-5 years. These punishments also
extended to addicts who failed to register or failed to quit opium within a specified time
frame. These new measures were carried out all across China.
The General Order had its strongest impact on poppy cultivation in rural China.
The regions with the most widespread poppy cultivation were Sichuan, Yunnan and
Guizhou. Shaanxi and Fujian also showed extensive poppy cultivation. Several other
provinces, such as Gansu, contained moderate levels of poppy cultivation and thus were
also impacted by the General Order’s mandates. All of these regions showed changes in
the way in which their provincial governments managed poppy cultivation and any
trafficking connected to them.
First, in an effort to encourage the prioritization of opium suppression in rural
China, the campaign’s goals were linked to land reform. This was a rather unique tactic
because it took advantage of existing social changes taking place within rural China. A
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major focus during the PRC’s early years was the division and redistribution of land
owned by the landlord class.33 In 1950, the Chinese government passed the Agrarian
Reform Law. Under this law, land owned by rural landlords was divided and
redistributed, severing the landlord’s control over the land. The Agrarian Reform Law
affected poppy cultivation because farmers produced opium by seeding large properties
with opium poppy which made it easier for landowners to mass produce the poppyderived drug. Dividing and redistributing ownership of these properties made it more
difficult for poppy farmers to sustain their previous levels of poppy cultivation. A second
benefit of the Agrarian Reform Law is that it led to the creation of cadres who also took
part in the destruction of poppy fields. As a result, land reform aided in the reduction of
poppy cultivation in rural China.
Guangxi, now an autonomous region in southern China, suffered from a
combination of poppy cultivation and opium trafficking. Part of this issue originated
with warlordism in Guangxi. During the 1920’s and 1930’s, Guangxi warlords forced
peasants to grow opium so that the warlords could profit off of the revenue collected
from opium and strengthen their military and political power. Guangxi was also an
important region for drug traffickers. The “Guangxi Corridor” connected opium farms in
Yunnan to large cities along eastern China. These factors allowed Guangxi to establish
itself as an important constituent in opium trade. Its role in opium trade continued into
the 1940’s and early 1950’s. With over 200,000 mu (32,947 acres) of farmland dedicated
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to poppy cultivation and over 30,000 drug traffickers, Guangxi had to employ multiple
methods of control to tear down the entire region’s market.34
Guangxi’s provincial government began by outlawing poppy cultivation. Poppy
farms were uprooted, and any opium or drug paraphernalia found in a citizen’s
possession was confiscated by law enforcement and destroyed. To deal with drug
smugglers, Guangxi officials developed lists of individuals suspected to be involved in
drug smuggling before arresting them in waves. The drug offenders arrested would be
interrogated, then sentenced to jail for up to ten years. Over the course of this
campaign, Guangxi’s poppy farms and smuggling rings were permanently shut down.
Liangshan (Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture of Sichuan), another
significantly rural region of China, also contained widespread poppy cultivation. It is
estimated that in some parts of Liangshan, 60-80 percent of locals grew opium poppy.
Another 50-60 percent regularly smoked opium.35 Because both smoking and
production of opium were present in Liangshan, local magistrates employed two main
methods of suppressing opium. First, farmers were taxed for growing opium. If officials
discovered opium poppies growing on the locals’ farmland, these locals would be
charged a tax for growing the crop. The taxes were significant enough that farmers
would profit more by cultivating other crops. These taxes helped discourage farmers
from continuing to grow the crop. Along with this method, in 1950, Liangshan’s local
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government issued a statement ordering the closure of all opium dens in the region.
This decision left opium smokers with fewer places where they could smoke the drug.
Yunnan was also careful in the way in which it carried out its own suppression
campaign. Historically, Yunnan was known for producing high quality opium. Its fertile
soil allowed Yunnan farmers to produce opium that could be sold at double the price of
opium produced in other provinces. Even in the 19th century, Yunnan was known as a
principal region for opium cultivation in China to the extent that opium poppies were
considered one of the regions’ most valuable exports.36 Drug traffickers purchased
expensive Yunnan opium and shipped the drugs to other provinces. Therefore, it was
important that Yunnan address the activities of opium farmers and smugglers.
In 1949, the Yunnan Provincial government found that at least 2,400,000 mu
(395,369 acres) in the province was used for growing opium poppies, and yearly
production of opium was approximately 250,000 liang (12,500 kilograms). Some sources
claim that up to 3 percent of agricultural land in Yunnan was composed of poppy
fields.37 In June of 1950, Yunnan released an Opium Suppression Directive describing
ways in which Yunnan would seek to eliminate opium. To counter opium, Yunnan
disseminated propaganda and began uprooting poppy fields. Some parts of Yunnan
were visited by government officials who educated locals about the dangers of opium
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addiction. In some more populated parts of Yunnan, cartoons and small rallies
discouraged cultivation and consumption.38 Propaganda encouraged locals to
voluntarily end the cultivation of opium poppies and report drug trafficking. In 1951,
Yunnan uprooted over 6000 kilograms of opium poppy. Local law enforcement agents
also located and arrested drug dealers. Captured drug dealers were most frequently
given jail sentences and, in some cases, were executed.39 By 1951, the Yunnan
government announced that it had eliminated opium in all but its most outlying
counties.
Not all of the anti-drug policies involved the use of force. Citizens were also
encouraged to play active roles in drug suppression. The Guizhou Provincial government
encouraged locals to create a “new Guizhou.” Citizens were given the option to
voluntarily surrender any drugs in their possession and avoid facing jailtime for their
crimes. Addicts could also register themselves with anti-drug agencies, such as the
Central Ministry of Public Security, and receive help from health volunteers in quitting
their addictions. As a result of these lenient directives, out of the 18,000 drug offenders
discovered in Guizhou in 1951, 11,700 of them were able to be registered and
rehabilitated.40 Addicts who took part in rehabilitation programs were provided
medications that alleviated their withdrawal symptoms and helped them gradually
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reduce their consumption of opium. Regions like Guizhou were able to carry out
successful rehabilitation programs.
Provincial governments also recognized the reasons why peasants would
cultivate opium poppies. Poppy plants were popular in Yunnan due to the high value of
the opium sap produced by the poppies which could be harvested and sold in markets
or trafficked to cities. The money earned could be used to purchase grain and daily
necessities. Another motivation was that opium was a popular pain-killer for laborers.
Provincial governments addressed these motivations by providing farmers with the
means to grow other crops. Provincial governments gave farmers seeds which they
could use to cultivate grain and cash crops without relying on revenue from poppy
cultivation. Newly opened clinics also aided laborers in treating their opium addiction.41
These measures made it easier for peasants to end their contribution to the opium
market.
These more lenient measures, rather than arrests and executions, most likely
played a more significant role in the success of the campaign. While executions and
mass arrests were occasionally used to intimidate drug offenders into either turning
themselves in or ceasing their illegal behavior, they had little long-term effect.
Incentivizing citizens to give up opium proved to be a more reliable method because it
provided peasants and other members of society a means through which to end their
reliance on opium.

41

Helan Niu. "Yunnan sheng jianguo chuqi jindu douzheng dui dangqian jindu gongzuo de qishi
[The War Against Drugs in Yunnan Province at the Founding of the Country]." Journal of Yunnan
Police Officer Academy (2011): 17-18.

29

Poppy cultivation came to a swift end when the Government Administrative
Council released a directive officially banning all poppy cultivation and granting law
enforcement the right to seize and destroy any opium found in rural regions in 1952.
However, complete elimination of opium in rural China did not happen all at once. Each
region needed to employ its own methods to bring an end to opium production.
The strength of rural China’s opium campaign was not just that it was
implemented in every region where the PRC found opium to be present. It was also the
coordination through which the campaign took place. It was only through careful
planning, selection and execution that these rural counties and provinces were able to
eliminate all forms of drug offending. Unlike former campaigns which still left routes
through which opium propagation and trafficking could continue, the 1950’s campaign
left no opportunities for opium to persist where the campaign had completed its work.
While the tactics described in this chapter were highly successful in rural China,
urban China presented a different set of challenges. The PRC government needed to
apply new solutions to the complex situation of opium in China’s cities.
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Chapter 3: Opium Suppression in Urban China
Both rural and urban regions of China suffered from the pervasiveness of opium.
Despite this commonality, these two distinct regions of China saw opium’s presence
manifested in different ways. While rural China was the main location of poppy
cultivation, a majority of opium smoking took place within cities. Shanghai was
estimated to have at least 8,000 sellers and 20,000 opium dens in 1949.42 Several cities
were populated with opium dens, locations where citizens would congregate to smoke
the illegal drug. In some cities, there was as many as eight opium dens for every square
mile on average.43 In the countryside, regions were less densely populated with opium
dens and thus smoking wasn’t as common.
The stark difference in smoking habits between cities and rural villages was
connected to the history and culture surrounding Chinese opium. In late Qing Shanghai,
opium smoking played a significant role in the city’s economy and its citizens’
recreational activities. Opium, due to its light weight and relative value, could be
exchanged as a form of currency and used to trade for valuable goods. Also, wealthy
officials, merchants and scholars would frequent opium dens where they smoked opium
as a form of leisure. Opium smoking was seen as a luxury that only the wealthiest and
most powerful citizens could enjoy. In this way, smoking became a form of conspicuous
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consumption. Because of the way in which many Chinese valued opium as a luxury
good, cities were able to develop extensive opium trading networks that sustained their
many opium dens for decades.
While suppression campaigns during the early 20th century impacted the
openness with which Chinese citizens residing in cities could smoke opium, smoking
continued well into the 20th century. The two largest centers for opium smoking were
Shanghai and Nanjing. However, opium smoking was also present in other cities. Cities
in Fujian contained up to 100,000 opium dens in 1949.44 Opium produced in regions like
Yunnan and Sichuan was transported to cities in significant quantities and sold to
smokers by drug dealers. At the beginning of the 1940’s, Nanjing was importing at least
2550 kilograms of opium each year.45 These levels of importation were sustained
throughout the 1940’s.
The Communists sought to introduce new suppression measures to China’s
cities. However, for Nanjing, opium suppression was not a new concept. The city had
previously attempted to eradicate opium during the 1920’s. Prior to the 1950’s
campaign, the city used propaganda “showing the evils of the use of opium” and handed
out licenses to addicts and opium shops.46 The goal was to exert control over opium
consumption and slowly restrict smokers’ access to the drug. Contrary to expectations,
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this licensing system revealed itself to be ineffectual as it provided a loophole through
which opium shops could continue their operations. The Opium Suppression Committee
later banned the licensing system in an effort to stamp out any remaining drug activity.
In the 1930’s, Nanjing also butted heads with the National Anti-Opium Association when
it attempted to enforce opium suppression legislation within the city. Instead of
receiving the city’s cooperation, the association was met with opposition as Nanjing
benefitted from the taxes derived from the sale of opium.47 In the end, both of these
attempts to reduce opium consumption in Nanjing failed.
Because of the previous difficulties faced while controlling opium within cities,
the PRC government utilized multiple methods of eradicating drug activity. First,
propaganda was created and distributed to shift public opinion on the matter of opium.
Propaganda pushed a narrative that citizens must “resist America, aid Korea: oppose
reactionaries and suppress opium.”48 Connecting the Communist Party’s anti-drug
efforts to the Korean War aided the CCP in gaining the confidence of Chinese citizens
and further solidify their control over the country. Citizens were encouraged to liken
success in opium suppression to success in the CCP’s political and war efforts. Along
with connecting opium suppression to the Korean War, some propaganda campaigns
told citizens that the sale of opium and other drugs was part of a secret plot by
foreigners to bring harm to Chinese people and society. Propaganda equated quitting
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opium smoking to patriotism, and supporting the drug’s trafficking to opposing the PRC
government. Since the PRC government sought to avoid bringing international attention
to the suppression campaign, the Directive on Anti-Drug Propaganda outlawed the use
of paper propaganda. In the place of newspapers and other forms of media that could
potentially leave the country, propaganda trucks and buses would drive through cities
expressing anti-drug sentiments over speakers. Also, in Tianjin, propagandists would
travel door-to-door informing locals of upcoming meetings and spreading propaganda.
The use of propaganda vehicles and verbal news sharing aided the suppression
campaign in telegraphing propaganda throughout cities.
The propaganda campaign was very important in motivating Chinese citizens.
Many doubted the campaign’s potential for success. In many cities, locals saw little to
no change in the level of drug activity despite hearing claims that law enforcement was
attempting to curb the issue. Several drug dealers were arrested only to walk free within
a few days and continue their drug operations giving locals more reason to doubt the
Communists’ ability to eradicate opium. To help renew citizens’ trust in the PRC
government, cities began organizing meetings and rallies in conjunction with
propaganda campaigns to inspire locals. Hundreds of thousands of public meetings were
held between 1949 and 1952 to encourage citizens to report any drug activity and for
drug offenders to turn themselves in. The city of Guangzhou held 11,000 anti-drug
rallies, of which approximately 1.2 million people participated. Shenyang saw similar
levels of participation. These rallies had a significant impact on the success of the 1950’s
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campaign as approximately 700 people confessed to their crimes following a single
meeting in Xian.49
Along with supporting opium suppression, these rallies also fostered a sense of
patriotism among Chinese citizens. On April 14, 1951, 40,000 people in the city of Dali in
Yunnan Province held a rally that strengthened opposition to both opium and American
involvement in the Korean War. By connecting opium suppression to the Korean War
and social movements within China, the PRC government was able to further mobilize
the masses to assist in the efforts to eliminate opium from cities.
To encourage greater participation in anti-drug rallies, Beijing offered opium
addicts the opportunity to register during rallies.50 By registering during these rallies,
addicts could potentially avoid being punished for possessing opium. This incentive
proved to be successful as registration rates significantly increased in Beijing following
rallies.
Cities also encouraged citizens to participate in decision-making regarding antidrug operations. Shanghai and other large cities formed committees composed of heads
of society and community leaders. These committees assisted city governments in
setting up plans for propaganda, rallies, inspections and sentencing. The active
participation of citizens in opium suppression within urban areas fostered the mass
mobilization of Chinese citizens during the anti-drug campaign.
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Along with organizing propaganda campaigns and rallies, the Communists also
worked towards aggressively seeking out and punishing drug offenders. Since poppy
cultivation was less extensive in the vicinity of China’s cities, municipal governments
instead focused on the existing networks of opium dealers and addicts. In many cities,
instead of focusing efforts on arresting individual drug users, law enforcement officers
arrested and punished drug lords and major distributors.51 These individuals were
important in maintaining the underground network of smugglers and dealers that fed
drug trade in urban areas.
Nanjing was one such city that took major efforts to arrest drug offenders. At the
start of the PRC’s opium suppression campaign, Nanjing suffered from a serious drug
trafficking problem. Its large population made the city a prime target for opium dealers
and smugglers. According to Ma Weigang’s research, out of 145 of Nanjing’s local
industries, 56 showed signs of participating in Nanjing’s drug trafficking system.52 While
Nanjing was able to identify many of the participants in drug trade, the city often
handed out lean sentences to those offenders who were caught. From May to
December 1949, officers uncovered 1,569 cases of opium smuggling and caught 472
drug offenders. Of these 472 offenders, however, only 26 of them faced jail sentences.
The vast majority were either released or only served minor punishments. In 1950,
2,090 offenders were arrested, but only 345 of them went to court. These statistics
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indicate that while Nanjing experienced some success in uncovering smuggling, little
was done to punish the drug offenders discovered. The main cause of the leniency was
most likely the incentives Nanjing put in place for confiscating drugs but not for
arresting and punishing drug offenders, an issue that unintentionally led to less severe
punishments.
The Interior Ministry of the Government Administrative Council agreed that
punishments for drug-related crimes needed to be more severe. To harshen the
punishments for drug offenses, the council ordered that no bonuses be awarded to law
enforcement or informants based on the amount of opium seized. Since some districts
offered law enforcement officers bonuses for seizing opium but not arresting offenders,
many officers would simply confiscate opium but fail to arrest and punish the drug
dealers the opium was confiscated from. As a result, law enforcement was allowing drug
dealers to continue their operations in exchange for opium that could be turned in for
bonuses. Outlawing these bonuses removed a major incentive for officers to ignore drug
offenses. Secondly, several districts were issued guidelines requiring stricter
punishments for arrested drug offenders. In Shanghai, for instance, these guidelines laid
out who could be considered a drug offender and the ways in which these drug
offenders had to be punished.53 These changes helped cities confront corruption and
bribery among law enforcement agents.
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Shanghai had better luck handling drug dealers. After the passing of the General
Order, Shanghai immediately banned the production, sale and consumption of opium.
Agents raided drug factories and confiscated tools used for the production of drugs.
Shanghai also began efforts to locate individuals in possession of drugs and to confiscate
drug paraphernalia. From 1950 to 1951, Shanghai had experienced 6,873 drug seizures,
arrested 12,211 suspects and confiscated over 18,000 kilograms of drugs.54 These
arrests and seizures continued until the end of the campaign in 1952 when Shanghai
successfully eradicated opium consumption.
As was the case in rural regions of China, during the second wave of the
campaign from 1950 to 1952, law enforcement agents in cities made arrests in waves to
avoid alerting targeted drug offenders. After arresting suspected drug dealers, agents
would interrogate suspects for more information regarding their drug operations. In
Tianjin, arrested offenders would be interrogated regarding their crimes, then
sentenced to harsh prison terms. Law enforcement used information gathered during
these interrogations to locate drug lords and factories where opium products were
produced.
Along with drug dealing, city governments also addressed the issue of opium
addiction. To aid drug addicts, cities opened rehabilitation centers. Over the course of
the campaign, Shanghai’s municipal government donated 360 million old yuan to
addicts undergoing rehabilitation. In Nanjing, rehabilitation centers were built and over
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one thousand addicts voluntarily signed up for rehabilitation. Unfortunately, due to
limited resources, many of Nanjing’s rehab centers were closed shortly after being
opened.
Despite the initial setbacks faced during the campaign, cities were successful in
eradicating opium. Nanjing, for example, managed to seize over 100 kilograms of crude
opium and heroin between 1949 and 1951. In 1953, Shanghai announced that all known
opium operations had been eliminated. By the end of the campaign in 1952, only a few
pockets of opium consumption were left to be dealt with throughout China.
There were several reasons why urban campaigns succeeded in eradicating
opium. One major reason was the level of coordination by the Central Ministry of Public
Security in organizing the drug campaign across multiple cities. The Ministry of Public
Security determined where further information needed to be acquired, when arrests
should be made, as well as where propaganda should be disseminated. A second reason
was the mass mobilization of city residents. Residents participated in rallies and
committees providing opportunities for millions of citizens to aid in opium eradication.
Another significant aspect of the campaign was that each city adjusted their tactics to
solve the most pressing concerns involving opium’s presence within the city. These
strategies are what allowed the 1950’s campaign to eradicate opium within Chinese
cities.
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Conclusion
For centuries, opium persisted as a popular drug within China. Because of its
addictive effects and association with foreign invasion, opium had become a major focus
of numerous Chinese governments’ attentions. Lin Zexu attempted to end opium trade
in Canton during the 1830’s. The Chinese Nationalists made multiple attempts to end
opium consumption and poppy cultivation a century later. Despite these attempts to
curb the spread of opium throughout China, not until the early 1950’s did China
eradicated the drug.
The 1950’s represents a critical period of time when the Chinese Communist
Party made significant progress in China’s anti-drug campaign. The 1950’s opium
suppression campaign allowed China to accomplish its goal of eradicating opium
trafficking and consumption on a national basis. The campaign was so successful that
there were no reported cases of opium-related drug activity until the 1980’s when
heroin use spread to China.
The campaign also played a significant role in unifying China beneath the
Communist Party. After the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the Communists worked to
consolidate its control over regions that were originally under the control of the Chinese
Nationalist Party. The opium suppression campaign was a convenient means through
which the CCP could achieve this goal. The anti-drug campaign gained moral support for
the Communist Party and solidified power for the Communists in China’s cities.
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By studying this campaign, the key to the campaign’s success becomes apparent.
The PRC government’s emphasis on combining many tactics to achieve the complete
eradication of opium within each region the campaign operated in. The PRC government
not only cut off vital pillars supporting the production and trafficking of opium within
each region, but also mobilized the Chinese public to cooperate with eradication efforts.
This distinct method of drug eradication is what made the 1950’s campaign accomplish
its goals despite failures in previous decades.
The key strategies that China utilized during the 1950’s campaign are applicable
to the world’s current opiate crisis. The causes and complications surrounding this
opiate crisis are highly complex and will require extensive planning and consideration to
remedy. For example, the return of opiates in contemporary China was the result of
smuggling of addictive drugs from neighboring countries into China. Similarly, the
United States also suffers from an opioid epidemic due to the spread of heroin and
other opioids in drug markets. The resulting outbreak of drug addiction persists to this
day. An analysis of China’s history eradicating opium allows for some insight into how
countries could address their drug epidemics. By employing similar anti-drug strategies
within other nations, the current opiate crisis could potentially be remedied.
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